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ABSTRACT
This paper builds a unifying framework that, within the theory of intertemporal consumption choices,
brings together the limited participation -based explanation of the poor empirical performance of the
C-CAPM  and  the  transaction  costs-based  explanation  of  incomplete  portfolios.  Using  the
implications of the consumption model and observed household consumption and portfolio choices,
we identify the preference parameters of interest and a lower bound for the costs rationalizing
non-participation in financial markets, in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for
consumption and portfolio allocation. Using the US Consumer Expenditure Survey and assuming
isoelastic preferences, we estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion at 1.7 and a cost bound
of 0.4 percent of non-durable consumption. Our estimate of the preference parameter is theoretically
plausible and the bound sufficiently small to be likely to be exceeded by the actual total (observable
















The dynamics of consumption and saving behaviour is obviously related to
the demand for assets and, as such, can provide valuable information for
equilibrium asset pricing. The pathbreaking contributions of Lucas (1978)
and Breeden (1979) made the link between the Euler equation for consump-
tion and equilibrium asset prices explicit and used the ￿rst-order conditions
of a consumer problem to build what is known as the Consumption Capital
Asset Pricing Model (C-CAPM). Unfortunately, despite the formal elegance
and the analytical simplicity of the C-CAPM, the empirical performance of
the model has been, at best, mixed. Since the early studies by Hansen and
Singleton (1982, 1983), it was clear that observed asset returns are incon-
sistent with the dynamics of consumption choices, at least as observed in
aggregate data. Such evidence was re-inforced and con￿rmed in a large num-
ber of other studies. Some studies, such as Hansen and Jagannathan (1991),
suggested that one of the reasons for the poor empirical performance of the
model is the low level of variability of aggregate consumption growth.
Recently, there have been several attempts at rationalizing this discour-
aging evidence and several studies have explored the possibility that limited
participation in ￿nancial markets might explain the disparity between the-
oretical predictions and empirical evidence. More precisely, since the ￿rst
order conditions of asset pricing models hold with equality only for those
households who own complete portfolios, the models should be tested for
this subset of households and not for the whole population. As a conse-
quence, since in practice relatively few households hold shares directly, even
abstracting from standard aggregation issues arising from the non-linearity
of the marginal rate of substitution, the use of aggregate consumption data
in evaluating asset pricing models could be very misleading.
These points have been stressed by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Attana-
sio et al. (2002), Vissing Jorgensen (2002) and Paiella (2004), among others,
who propose limited ￿nancial market participation as a uni￿ed framework for
rationalizing the empirical rejection of the C-CAPM. These papers show that
accounting for portfolio heterogeneity and in particular for non-participation
into ￿nancial markets helps reconciling the predictions of the theory with the
empirical evidence. Attanasio et al. (2002), for instance, show that focussing
1Only the authors are responsible for the contents of this paper which do not necessarily
re￿ ect the views of the Bank of Italy.
2on the consumption of stockholders, not only yields estimates of preference
parameters that are in line with the theory, but one does not reject the overi-
dentifying restrictions implied by the model and, relatedly, the moments of
the marginal rate of substitution are within the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.
While these studies have been somewhat successful in reconciling the C-
CAPM with the empirical evidence, they take limited participation as given
and make no attempt of rationalizing it. Limited participation is in itself
a puzzle for the intertemporal consumption model, just like the observed
substantial di⁄erences in portfolio composition across agents and over the
life cycle. Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) have illustrated how such
behaviour is inconsistent with the maximization of expected lifetime utility,
which predicts that rational agents should invest an arbitrarily small amount
in all assets with positive expected return, including the risky ones, unless
there are non-linearities in the budget constraint.
One possible and obvious way to rationalize incomplete portfolios within
the intertemporal consumption model is by invoking non-proportional costs
of ￿nancial market participation (explicit and non-explicit). As such costs are
for the most part unobservable, the plausibility of this explanation depends
crucially on the magnitude these costs should have to explain observed data.
Should the size of these costs be ￿ reasonable￿one could ￿nd this explanation
attractive. Should instead the size of the participation costs that rationalize
observed data be very large one would probably dismiss this explanation.
One of the ￿rst papers to consider this approach was the study by Luttmer
(1999) in which, using aggregate data, he provides a lower bound on the
transaction costs that would rationalize the model in the face of available
data. Paiella (2006), using micro data, provides evidence in support of this
hypothesis by bounding from below the costs of participation to some ￿-
nancial markets. Her bounds for the stock market are as small as $130 per
year, which implies that it is likely that the true (unobservable) costs of
participation may exceed this level in reality.2
This paper brings together the limited participation-based explanation of
the poor empirical performance of the C-CAPM and the transaction cost-
based explanation of incomplete portfolios to build a powerful test of the the-
ory of the intertemporal allocation of consumption. Using the implications of
the consumption model and observed consumption and portfolio choices, we
2Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) provides additional evidence in favor of the participation
cost hypothesis, at least for some consumers.
3show how to identify the preference parameters of interest and a lower bound
for the costs of participation in ￿nancial markets rationalizing participation
choices in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in consumption tastes.
The estimation of the parameters of interest is based on the necessary condi-
tions for the optimality of observed behavior of ￿nancial market participants
and non-participants. The methodology relies on the (empirical) distinction
between the consumption path of those households holding a well-diversi￿ed
portfolio of assets and the consumption path of those holding incomplete
portfolios. The former exploit all trading opportunities and their consump-
tion dynamics is consistent with the time series properties of asset prices.
The latter do not and by structurally estimating a lower bound to the gains
they forego for holding an incomplete portfolio we can bound from below
the costs that would rationalize their non-participation. We implement our
approach using individual level data to estimate the preference parameters
and the cost bound.3
Our approach for the cost bound identi￿cation builds on and generalizes
the works of Luttmer (1999) and Paiella (2006). Luttmer (1999) focuses on
the losses for leaving unexploited some trading opportunities and proposes
a lower bound on the level of ￿xed transaction costs reconciling per-capita
expenditure and asset returns. Hence, the foregone gains that Luttmer iden-
ti￿es bound from below the cost of trading that would justify not taking
advantage of temporary changes in returns not matched by changes in the
riskiness of assets. Luttmer￿ s frictions are the costs that a representative
agent must pay to trade and modify her consumption path. Luttmer￿ s con-
sumer pays a transaction cost whenever consumption di⁄ers from income.
Instead, we use individual level data and, by distinguishing between holders
and non-holders of risky assets, we focus on the loss for missing out on the
equity premium. Our consumers do not pay a cost to save in a safe assets
and our frictions are the costs that individual agents must pay in order to
participate to the market for risky assets.4
3Earlier work considering the impact of frictions for asset pricing models includes
Luttmer (1996). Luttmer shows that small proportional transaction costs on stocks may
reconcile aggregate consumption-based discount factors with asset return data.
4Luttmer￿ s estimates of the bound to the costs of trading are potentially biased because
they are obtained using aggregate expenditure data, which include both the consumption
of those who hold ￿nancial assets and the consumption of those who do not. For the latter
the bene￿ts of trading in ￿nancial markets are likely to go beyond those associated to the
capturing of excess returns.
4Our participation costs can be interpreted in two ways. First of all, they
can be thought of as re￿ ecting the costs of information and transaction that
would induce households not to invest in some securities; secondly, they can
be thought of as the costs of following near-rational decision rules. In the ￿rst
instance, we would have two types of households: one who pays the ￿xed cost
to invest in asset j and whose consumption, net of the cost, is coherent with
the Euler equation for asset j; the other who does not pay the cost because
its expected gain from the investment is relatively too low. Households share
the same preference parameters, investment opportunities and information
sets, but di⁄erences in their observable socio-demographic characteristics and
possibly in unobservable attributes result in di⁄erences in the gains from ￿-
nancial market participation. In the second instance, households behave
according to di⁄erent decision rules. Those who participate follow rational
decision processes that can be modelled as solutions to the maximization of
the intertemporal choice model. Those who do not participate follow heuris-
tic decision processes. For the latter the gains of fully optimizing, that we
estimate by maximizing their utility under the assumption of full rationality,
can be expected to be lower than their costs of solving the model for the
optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption, which are primarily costs
of information, attention, etc.. Di⁄erences in socio-demographic characteris-
tics and possibly in unobservable attributes can justify the di⁄erences in the
costs of behaving according to rational decision processes.
Paiella (2006) focuses on the behaviour of non-participants. While her
approach delivers lower bounds for the participation cost that are conceptu-
ally similar to those we propose here, these estimates are based on speci￿c
assumptions on preference parameters. Instead, we simultaneously estimate
the preference parameters and the bounds on participation costs. Moreover,
as we use information on both participants and non-participants we need less
stringent assumptions about the nature of unobserved heterogeneity.
Using the US Consumer Expenditure Survey and assuming isoelastic pref-
erences with multiplicative preference heterogeneity, we estimate the coef-
￿cient of relative risk aversion at 1.7 and a cost bound of 0.4 percent of
non-durable consumption. Our estimate of the preference parameter is theo-
retically plausible and the bound su¢ ciently small to be likely to be exceeded
by the actual total (observable and unobservable) costs of participating to ￿-
nancial markets. This implies that consumption asset pricing models provide
an accurate description of the data once limited participation, ￿xed costs of
participation and taste heterogeneity are properly accounted for.
5The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
framework that we use to identify household preference parameters and the
bound to the participation costs, within the type of environment speci￿ed by
the model of intertemporal choice. Section 3 derives our econometric model
based on the conditions for the optimality of consumption of stockholders and
of non-stockholders. Section 4 presents the data. In Section 5, we discuss
the results from the estimation. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Investing in ￿nancial assets involves information gathering, decision mak-
ing, brokerage fees and/or other ￿xed costs that can create a disincentive
to portfolio diversi￿cation. Such frictions may end up o⁄seting the positive
return paid by the asset. The heterogeneity of portfolio choices can then be
explained on the basis of di⁄erences in socio-demographic and other, observ-
able and unobservable individual speci￿c characteristics, without the need
of assuming heterogeneity in preferences parameters. Such di⁄erences would
then also be re￿ ected in di⁄erences in consumption. The paper tests this
hypothesis by jointly estimating the curvature of households￿utility function
and bounding from below the costs that would rationalize incomplete port-
folios for some consumers, but assuming that consumers are homogeneous in
terms of the curvature of the utility function. While preferences and partic-
ipation costs are jointly estimated using observations on both participants
and non-participants, intuitively it is clear that the curvature of the utility
function is identi￿ed by the consumption dynamics of those holding an opti-
mal portfolio of assets vis ￿ vis the dynamics of asset returns. On the other
hand, the lower bound on participation cost is identi￿ed by the gains that
incomplete portfolio holders forego by not-diversifying fully.
Consider an environment where households have rational expectations,
intertemporally additively separable preferences over consumption, a strictly
increasing and concave per-period utility function, U(ch;t;￿h;t), and a posi-
tive subjective discount rate, ￿. We assume that the instantaneous utility
function depends not only on consumption, ch;t, but also on an unobserv-
able taste shock, ￿h;t. In the empirical speci￿cation we will assume that this
shock enters multiplicatively. It can therefore be interpreted as representing
heterogeneity in discount factors.5
5In addition to the unobserved component, the taste shifter can also have an observed
6Households have access to two means to substitute consumption over
time: a risky asset yielding rt+1 and a riskfree asset yielding r
f
t+1. Let￿ s
assume that in order to invest in the risky asset households must pay a ￿xed
cost. This cost is higher than any cost the riskless asset investment may
involve. On the basis of portfolio composition, it is possible to distinguish
between two types of households: those who hold both risky and riskless
￿nancial assets and those who hold only riskless assets. For the risky asset










￿ (1 + rt+1)
)
= 1; (1)
where Etfg denotes the expectation conditional on the information available
at time t, U0() is the marginal utility of consumption and ￿ is the time
discount factor.
Let￿ s turn to those who have chosen not to invest in the risky asset.
Let fchgt, t = 1; 2;:::T be household h observable sequence of consumption
choices. Since households choose optimally, conditional on the information
available, and at time t they could have chosen any other feasible sequence
of consumption bundles, their time t expected ex-post utility gain from de-
viating from fchgt must be non-positive. More speci￿cally, we assume that,
at time t non-shareholders could have paid a ￿xed cost of ￿ units of con-
sumption, invested in the risky asset and adjusted consumption from (ch;t,
ch;t+1) to (ch;t + ah;t ￿ ￿ch;t, ch;t+1 + bh;t+1)). ah;t and bh;t+1 denote a feasible
consumption perturbation. Optimality of their observed choices (ch;t, ch;t+1)
implies that:
Et fvh;t+1 (ah;t;bh;t+1;￿)g ￿ 0: (2)
where vh;t+1 (ah;t;bh;t+1;￿) is the ex-post utility gain that they could have
one. This speci￿cation is consistent with the speci￿cations often used in the empirical
literature on Euler equations (see Attanasio , 1999). With CRRA utility, the instantaneous
utility function would take the form: U(c;z;￿) =
(c)
1￿￿
1￿￿ expf￿z+￿g; where the term z is a
vector of observable variables, and ￿ represents unobserved heterogeneity. In the empirical
speci￿cation that we use we have not introduced z variables (such as demographic factors)
in an unrestrictive fashion. Our utility is expressed in terms of consumption per adult
equivalent.
7obtained by paying the ￿xed cost ￿ch;t and perturbing consumption:
vh;t+1 (ah;t;bh;t+1;￿) = fU (ch;t + ah;t ￿ ￿ch;t) + ￿U(ch;t+1 + bh;t+1g +
￿fU (ch;t) + ￿U (ch;t+1)g; (3)
where we have suppressed the dependence of the utility function on ￿h;t for
notational convenience. Equation (2) says that, net of the cost ￿ch;t, the
expected utility gain from perturbing the observed consumption path is non-
positive. Hence, the investment is not worth. Inequalities like (2) must hold
for any t.
The ￿xed cost ￿ cannot be observed directly. However, following an ap-
proach similar to that proposed by Luttmer (1999) and generalized recently
by Pakes et al. (2005) (see also Manski 2003), we can place a lower bound on
it. For any given (ah;t;bh;t+1), the function Et fvh;t+1 (ah;t;bh;t+1;￿)g is con-
tinuous and decreasing in ￿, as Uh() is continuous and increasing. Hence, for
any given (ah;t;bh;t+1), there is a unique value d(ah;t;bh;t+1) such that (2) is
satis￿ed if ￿ ￿ d(ah;t;bh;t+1). The function d(ah;t;bh;t+1) is de￿ned implicitly
as the solution to the equation Et fvh;t+1 (ah;t;bh;t+1;d)g = 0. In practice, we
are interested in the lower bound d such that (2) is satis￿ed for any ￿ ￿ d,
i.e. if d = max d(ah;t;bh;t+1). As Et fvh;t+1 (ah;t;bh;t+1;￿)g is continuous and
decreasing in ￿, such d solves the equation:
max
ah;t;bh;t+1
Et fvh;t+1 (ah;t;bh;t+1;d)g = 0: (4)
The parameter d is the Hicks compensating variation for non investing in
an asset yielding rt+1. d is a lower bound to the foregone gains for holding an
incomplete portfolio, which in turn are a lower bound to the cost ￿ that would
rationalize non-participation. The ￿true￿foregone gains for holding a sub-
optimal portfolio are just a lower bound to the participation costs, because
the (unobservable) costs ￿ may be so large that households are never close
to deviating from their actual choices. In this instance, by construction, a
level of gains that is much smaller than ￿ will su¢ ce to rationalize observed
choices. The bound will be closer to the true cost the more pro￿table the
trading rule (ah;t;bh;t+1): Further, d is a lower bound to the foregone gains of
incomplete portfolios: the expected utility gains of deviating from observed
portfolio choices may be higher than those captured by equation (4) for at
least two reasons. First, the framework behind equation (4) measures the
expected gains of using an extra instrument to adjust consumption over two
8periods. Thus, if the conditioning information set of the agent is larger
than that of the econometrician, the agent may be actually able to obtain
a higher utility gain than the econometrician can estimate. Second, we are
approximating the utility from spreading the gains from the investment over
the entire lifetime horizon of the utility maximizing agent with the utility
from spreading the gains over the two periods when the investment takes
place. This set up leaves households￿consumption plans unchanged at all
other dates and allows to appraise the gains that households forego for non-
investing for one period by focusing just on their consumption at two adjacent
dates.
Overall d provides the basis for a heuristic test of the cost of participation
hypothesis: for the latter to be a plausible explanation of incomplete portfo-
lios, any reasonable cost of participation must be higher than our estimated
bound. Although this is not the most powerful test, it is indeed the most re-
liable. A more powerful test would compare the costs with the true foregone
gain -not just with a lower bound, as done here. However, the estimation of
the true foregone gain would require a much larger amount of information
and/or assumptions.
3 Empirical speci￿cation
The analysis is based on the conventional assumption that utility exhibits
constant relative risk aversion. Regarding the trading strategy in case of
participation, we assume that after paying the ￿xed cost for investing in
the risky asset, non-shareholders adjust their current savings.6 Let xc
h;t(￿c)
denote the fraction of time t consumption they give up and invest in the risky
asset. ￿c is a vector of parameters to be estimated. We also assume that
they consume all the returns on the investment when they realize it. The























￿fU (ch;t) + ￿U (ch;t+1)g;
6In the appendix, we consider the case where, rather than adjusting only their con-
sumption (and savings), households are also allowed to modify their portfolio and shift
resources from the risk free asset to the risky one. Given the limited information we have
on portfolio composition we preferred to perform the exercise that we report.
9where we have suppressed again the dependence of the utility function on
￿h;t for notational convenience. The estimation of the utility parameter and
of the cost bound then relies on two sets of ￿rst-order conditions. The ￿rst
set is the Euler equation in (1) which ensures the optimality of shareholders
consumption. The second set consists of the following equations, which must




















= 0; h 2 Hns; (6)
where D1 denotes the derivative with respect to the ￿rst argument of vh;t+1(:)
and Hns is the set of time t non-shareholders. Equation (5) determines
the optimal trading strategy in case of participation, given the cost. Since,
in practice, the actual cost, ￿, is not observed, nor estimated and only a
lower bound to the cost is identi￿ed, the optimal portfolio is determined as
a function of a cost equal to its estimated bound, d, which is consistent with
the rest of the analysis. Equation (6) determines the lower bound d to the
participation cost ￿, given the optimal investment.
Under the assumption of isoelastic preferences, and re-introducing unob-










= 1; h 2 Hs; (7)

























= 1; h 2 Hns;
(8)












Under the assumption that consumption and the rate of return on stock
are jointly lognormal and homoskedastic, we can loglinearize (7) and obtain:
log(1 + rt+1) = ￿s + ￿￿log(ch;t+1) + "h;t+1; h 2 Hs; (10)
10where ￿s is a function of the (conditional) second-order moments of con-
sumption and asset returns and the residual "h;t+1 includes the expectation
errors as well as the transformation of the unobserved heterogeneity term
￿h;t+1. Similarly, we can loglinearize equation (9) and obtain:







+"h;t+1; h 2 Hns:
(11)
Equations (10), and (11) together with (5) allow one to identify and es-
timate the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ￿, and a lower bound, d, to
the costs justifying limited ￿nancial market participation. They are condi-
tions for optimality that must be satis￿ed by consumption choices: (10) must
hold for shareholders, (5) and (11) for non-shareholders. Notice that (11) is
non-linear in the parameters of interest.
The two Euler equations for participants and non-participants can be
pooled together to obtain:









where ph;t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for participants to
the stock market.
Given the parameters of the investment rule, equation (12) can be es-
timated by standard GMM methods. Any instrument that is uncorrelated
with the expectational errors and the unobserved heterogeneity terms will be
a valid instrument.7








which implies a non-linearity in parameters. In principle, one could further
linearize (11) by applying a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion to the only term








proximated by ￿ d
xc
h;t(￿c). However, as we expect this ratio to be in the order
7The residual terms of these equations will also include the deviation between the con-
ditional second moments in the intercept term and their unconditional value. We will
therefore require that these deviations are orthogonal to the instrument used. See Attana-
sio and Low (2003) for a discussion of these issues.
11of 0:1, the approximation would be a poor one. We therefore prefer to apply
non-linear GMM techniques to estimate our parameters.








, which captures the di⁄erence in consumption growth be-
tween the relatively steep consumption path of shareholders and the ￿ atter
one of non-shareholders. If returns are high, the optimal investment in case of
participation (xc
h;t(￿c)) would be large, unless non-shareholders￿consumption
is correlated to the return on the risky asset due, for example, to some corre-
lation between individual income and the stock market. In this instance, in
order to justify non-shareholding or, equivalently, signi￿cant di⁄erences be-
tween shareholders￿and non-shareholders￿consumption, costs must be high
too. Furthermore, the more risk averse, the smaller the impact of costs:
the more risk averse, the smaller the investment in risky assets and, conse-
quently, the smaller the covariance of shareholders￿expenditure with asset
returns and the closer such covariance to that of non-shareholders￿expendi-
ture with returns.
As to the estimation of the investment rules based on equations (5), since
the data used for the analysis consist of repeated cross-sections, and not of
long individual consumption series, we cannot estimate individual optimal
rules. However, we can estimate the trading rules by summing over the
set of households who do not invest in the asset considered at t and taking

















= 0; h 2 Hns: (13)
The trading rule xc
h;t(￿c) is assumed to be linear in a set of forecasting vari-
ables zh;t that help to select the most pro￿table level of investment which is
then linear in consumption and wealth. In particular, in what follows, we
assume xc
h;t(￿c) = ￿c0zh;t: This set up allows capturing in the estimate the
predictability of the components of asset returns that are correlated with
consumption growth and the set of forecasting variables zh;t. As we discuss
below, the choice of the variables that determine the trading rule is some-
what arbitrary. The lower bound on the cost structure is then a function of
the variables used in the trading rule.
124 Data
The estimation of the preference parameters and of the ￿nancial participation
cost bound is based on data from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey,
which is run on a continuous basis by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
CEX is a representative sample of the US population. It is a rotating panel
in which interviews occur continuously throughout the year, each consumer
unit being interviewed every three months over a twelve-month period, apart
from attrition. As households complete their participation, new ones are
introduced into the panel on a regular basis and, as a whole, about 4500
households are interviewed each quarter, more or less evenly spread over the
three months.
At the time of the last interview, households provide information on their
asset holdings at that date and on the dollar di⁄erence with respect to the
amounts held twelve months earlier. The asset categories in the CEX are:
1. checking, brokerage and other accounts; 2. saving accounts; 3. US saving
bonds; 4. stocks, bonds, mutual funds and other securities. As a measure
of risky asset holdings, we take the amounts held in stocks, bonds, mutual
funds and other securities and US saving bonds. As a measure of riskless
asset holdings, we take the amounts held in checking and saving accounts. In
order to avoid problems arising from the simultaneity of expenditure growth
between t and t + 1 and portfolio composition at t + 1, the asset holding
status must be de￿ned at the beginning of period t. For this purpose, for
each asset category, we subtract from the stocks held at the time of the
last interview the amount of savings (the dollar change) carried out over the
previous twelve months. Hence, for each household we can de￿ne only one








The consumption measure that we use is deseasonalized, real monthly
per-adult equivalent expenditure on non-durable goods and services. Each
quarterly interview collects household monthly expenditure data on a variety
of goods and services for the previous three months. However, since the
information on asset holdings is annual, we use only two observations on
consumption and denote as ct and as ct+1 household per-adult equivalent
consumption based on the expenditure reported for the ￿rst and last month
of the year covered by the survey.
The data used for the analysis cover the period from 1982 to 2001, ￿rst
13quarter.8 Since interviews occur every month, t runs for a total of 208 pe-
riods (months). From the initial sample we exclude those households that
do not participate to all interviews, those living in rural areas or in univer-
sity housing and those whose head was under 21 or over 75 years old. We
also exclude those with incomplete income responses, those whose ￿nancial
supplement contains invalid blanks either in the stocks of assets or in the
dollar changes occurred with respect to the previous year and those whose
stocks of checking and saving accounts and/or of shares and bonds are non-
positive (15 percent of the sample). Finally, we drop those households whose
monthly consumption falls in the 1 percent tails of the distribution or whose
consumption growth over the year falls in the 5 percent tails. Overall, the
sample used consists of 24;016 households. The fraction of non-shareholders
has fallen from almost 65 percent in the ￿rst half of the eighties to less than 60
percent towards the end of the past decade. Table 1 reports some descriptive
statistics. Stockholders are slightly older than non-stockholders, they are
signi￿cantly more educated, their consumption is higher and substantially
more correlated with stock returns.
5 Results
As discussed above, the basis for our estimation is constituted by equations
(12) and (13). These two equations are orthogonality conditions that we will
exploit to obtain GMM estimates of the structural parameters. It is worth
stressing that, although we have several thousands individual observations,
consistency in estimation is achieved by having a large number of time pe-
riods. As discussed in Chamberlain (1984), large T asymptotic is necessary
in such a situation if one is not willing to assume the presence of complete
markets that make aggregate shocks identical for all consumers. Therefore,
the fact that we have 208 time periods is crucial. In the estimation, we
will also recognize the presence of aggregate shocks by allowing for arbitrary
8Around 1985-86 and 1995-1996, the sample design and the household identi￿cation
numbers were changed and after the ￿rst quarter of 1986 and of 1996 no track is kept of
those who had entered the survey in 1985 and in 1995, respectively. As a consequence
of this and of the fact that the information on ￿nancial asset holdings is collected during
the last interview, those households who have their ￿rst interview in the third and fourth
quarter of 1985 or of 1995 had to be excluded from the sample. Thus, the sample used
consists of households who have their ￿rst interview between January 1982 and June 1985,
between January 1986 and June 1995 and between January 1996 and June 2000.
14correlations among the residuals of individuals observed in the same time pe-
riod, as described in the appendix. Given the data structure, which includes
annual consumption growth observed at a monthly frequency, residuals for
individuals observed in adjacient mnoths will be correlated. This correlation
will decline only for individuals that are further than 11 months apart. As
discussed in Appendix B, in the compuation of standard errors we take this
structure into account. Finally, we also introduce cohort dummies in equa-
tions (12) and (13) to take into account possible di⁄erencs in tastes (and in
particular discount factors) across cohorts.
While in principle it is possible to estimate the parameters of these mod-
els considering equations (12) and (13) simultaneously, we used a recursive
approach. Given an initial guess for d and ￿, we estimate the parameters of
the trading rule by maximizing the utility gain in (13). Given the parameters
of the trading rule, we then estimate the parameters in (12) by non-linear
GMM. This second steps gives us new estimates for d and ￿. We iterate this
procedure until convergence.
The variables that enter the trading rule are somewhat arbitrary. It
should be remembered, however, that an incorrect speci￿cation of the trading
rule has only implications for the tightness of the bound. We specify the trad-
ing rule as a function of three variables: the risk free rate, the price/earning
ratio and the term premium. The last variable is lagged three periods, while
the other two are lagged two periods.
For the GMM procedure, we need instruments that are uncorrelated with
the unobserved heterogeneity in tastes and that are lagged two or more pe-
riods given the structure of our residuals, arising from the overlapping of the
observations on consumption growth.9 In addition to the variables that enter
the trading rule, we include a polynomial in the age of the household head,
cohort dummies, a time trend and other aggregate (lagged) price variables,
such the return on the risky asset, the risk premium and the price dividend
ratio. As a measure of risky asset return, we take the return on the S&P500
CI, as riskless return we take the return on 3-month Treasury bills, the risk
premium measure is given by the ratio of the yield of BAA bonds to that
of AAA bonds, and the term premium measure is computed as ratio of the
yield of 10-year government bonds to 3-month Treasury bills. The choice of
the instruments is based on a regression aimed at identifying which of the
available exogenous variables contributes the most to the prediction of the
9Interviews occur every month of the year.
15return on the S&P500.
Table 2 reports the results of the estimation of the parameters of interest.
The upper panel of the table reports the point estimates of the intercepts and
of the slope of equation (12), and of the cost bound, given the investment rule.
The bottom panel displays the coe¢ cients of non-stockholders￿investment
rule in case of participation, given risk aversion and the cost.
The estimates in the upper panel indicate a coe¢ cient of risk aversion
of 1:7. While this coe¢ cient is not estimated extremely precisely, the point
estimate indicates a theoretically plausible magnitude. The estimate of the
non-linear term imply a point etimate for the cost bound of 0:4 with a 95
percent con￿dence interval for the cost bound ranging from 0:1 percent to 1
percent of non-durable consumption. The cost bound is su¢ ciently small to
suggest that it is likely that the actual total (observable and unobservable)
costs of participation exceed it in reality. In fact, if we take average per-
adult equivalent non-stockholders monthly non-durable consumption from
Table 1 and multiply it by 12 and by 2:5, which is the mean of the per-adult
equivalent scale, and then multiply this by the estimated bound, we obtain
a dollar estimate of the cost bound of approximately $72 per year.
The investment rule coe¢ cients are precisely estimated based on equation
(13). They imply that, given a cost of 0:4 percent of non-durable consump-
tion and a risk aversion of 1:7, non-shareholders would maximize their gains
from participation by investing in the risky asset 4:2 percent of their current
consumption, on average. For costs higher than 0:4 percent they are better
o⁄ by non-investing at all.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper considers the poor empirical performance of the consumption-
based capital asset pricing model and builds a unifying framework that,
within the theory of intertemporal consumption choice, brings together lim-
ited participation and ￿xed participation costs to appraise their joint role
in explaining the disparity between the standard model predictions and the
empirical evidence. Allowing explicitely for heterogeneity in tastes, for di⁄er-
ences in the consumption paths of shareholders and non-shareholders and for
￿nancial market participation frictions, we show how to identify the prefer-
ence parameters of interest and a bound to the costs rationalizing incomplete
portfolios. Our approach yields Euler equation-based estimates of relative
16risk aversion around 1:7, which is a theoretically plausible value for the cur-
vature of the utility function. The bound to the costs needed to reconcile
the model with observed behavior turns out to be around 0:4 percent of
non-durable consumption. Costs higher than this bound would o⁄set the
gains of investing optimally in stocks for a large fraction of the population.
Our estimate is su¢ ciently low to make the participation cost-based expla-
nation of incomplete portfolios a reasonable explanation, because it is likely
that the true total costs of participation exceed this bound. Overall, our
results suggest that the intertemporal consumption model provides a suit-
able description of household behavior once ￿xed costs of participation and
unobservable heterogeneity in tastes are properly accounted for.
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19Appendix A: An Alternative Investment Strat-
egy and the Approximation of the First-Order
Condition for Non-Stockholders
Let￿ s assume that after paying the ￿xed cost for investing in the risky asset,
non-shareholders may adjust both their savings and their wealth allocation.
Let xc
h;t(￿c) denote the fraction of time t consumption they give up and invest
in the risky asset and xw
h;t(￿w) is the fraction of their wealth Wh;t, invested
at the riskless rate, that they move into the risky asset. ￿c and ￿w denote
the vectors of parameters. We also assume that they consume the return on

































￿fU (ch;t) + ￿U (ch;t+1)g;
where we have suppressed the dependency of the utility function on ￿h;t for
notational convenience. Under the assumption of isoelastic preferences and
multiplicative heterogeneity, the ￿rst-order condition for the optimality of
























Equation (15) can be approximated as follows. If we multiply and divide



































20Taking ￿rst-order Taylor expansions10 around 1 of the polynomials raised to





























After simplifying and collecting terms, we can re-write the ￿rst-order condi-




































Appendix B: The Variance-Covariance Matrix
of the Errors
The error structure of the main equation we estimate is complicated by sev-
eral factors. First, we deal with annual changes in consumption observed at a
monthly frequency. In a time series context this would induce MA(12) resid-
uals. Second, individuals observed over the same time periods or, given the
time frame just mentioned, over adjacent months, will be a⁄ected by similar
aggregate shocks. This implies correlation in the cross sectional dimension
of the residuals.
While the instrumenting strategy we used takes into account this complex
structure and guarantees that we obtain consistent estimates, in computing
the standard errors, we need to take it into consideration explicitly. The
residuals of equation (12) are expectational errors for an Euler equation and
can be expressed as the sum of 12 monthly innovations:
10Second- and higher-order terms can be ignored because they are small for reasonable










Each of the monthly innovations can be expressed as the sum of two er-
rors, one representing aggregate shocks and one purely idiosyncratic ones.
In other words, we express vh
t as the sum of its cross-sectional mean and

















i.e. it is time-varying. Then:
V ar("
h
























t￿j) 6= 0 if 0 < jt ￿ jj ￿ 11 (26)
= 0 if jt ￿ jj ￿ 11:
Our estimate of the elements of the variance-covariance matrix is based
on the internal product of the GMM residuals; hence it is heteroskedasticity
robust.
22Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
  Shareholders  Non-shareholders  All 
Age  48  47  47 
Education: Less than high school  0.07  0.18  0.14 
 High school diploma  0.44  0.51  0.49 
 University degree  0.49  0.30  0.38 
Gender (male=1)  0.74  0.66  0.69 
Race: White  0.93  0.87  0.89 
Marital status (married=1)  0.74  0.61  0.66 
Household with children  0.43  0.41  0.42 
       
Per-adult equivalent monthly expenditure  $646  $536   $580  
  (353)  (306)  (329) 
Consumption growth (∆log c) in the cross-section  0.06   0.04  0.05 
  (0.31)  (0.31)  (0.31) 
Corr(consumption growth, risky return)  0.0998  0.0069  0.0744 
       
Risky return: return of the S&P500CI  0.144     
  (0.143)     
Riskless return: return on 3-month T-bills  0.025     
  (0.018)     
Risk premium (BAA/AAA)  1.009     
  (0.004)     
Term premium (10yr gov. bonds/1yr gov. bonds)  1.011      
  (0.008)     
Price/Earnings ratio    20.019     
  (9.640)     
Price/Dividend ratio  41.308     
  (19.384)     
N. obs.  9,329  14,687  24,016 
Note: Shareholders hold both risky (stocks and bonds) and riskless (checking and saving accounts) assets; non-
shareholders  hold  only  riskless  assets.  Standard  errors  in  parentheses.  Expenditure  is  on  non-durable  and 
services, it is deseasonalized and in dollars of 2002. The returns on the risky and riskless asset are real returns. 
The Price/Earnings and Price/Dividend ratios are taken from Shiller’s homepage. Table 2 – GMM estimates 
LHS: log (1+rt+1)  Coefficients 






h,t))  -5.589 
(0.504) 
Non-shareholder dummy  0.304 
(0.451) 
Cohort: 1920-1929  -0.030 
(0.027) 
Cohort: 1930-1939  -0.015 
(0.019) 
Cohort: 1940-1949  -0.020 
(0.019) 
Cohort: 1950-1959  -0.024 
(0.023) 
Cohort: 1960+  -0.001 
(0.039) 
Constant  -0.049 
(0.261) 
Implied γ   ~ 1.7 
Implied d (cost bound)  0.4% 
Nobs  24,016 
Trading rule (f(z))   
r
f
t-2  -0.390 
  (0.008) 
(P/E)t-2  -0.102 





t-3  0.444 
  (0.008) 
 




Note:  The  set  of  instruments  include  the  risky  and  the  risk  free  rates,  the 
price/earning and the price/dividend ratios, the risk and the term premiums, a 
third-order polynomial in the age of the household head, cohort dummies, a time 
trend and a constant. The standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity 
robust and allow for the clusters and the correlation over time. 
 